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SURVIVOR CAN DISCLAIM BENEFITS OF JOINT AND
SURVIVORSHIP PROPERTIES
In Re Estate of Krakoff
87 Ohio L. Abs. 387, 179 N.E.2d 566 (P. Ct. 1961)
Krakoff died leaving his wife the surviving joint tenant of eight joint
and survivorship savings accounts and stock certificates issued by five dif-
ferent corporations. The survivor disclaimed her interest in the properties and
requested that they be administered as part of her husband's estate. The
Franklin County Probate Court permitted the disclaimer and stated that the
properties were thus probate assets ab initio.
The issue presented by this case had not previously been decided in
Ohio. The court relied on comparable renunciations that have been allowed
in other areas to arrive at its holding. The right of a third party beneficiary
of a contract to renounce the benefits of an arrangement made in his favor
was a major consideration in the court's decision.' Since Ohio does not
recognize the common law joint estate and its incident of survivorship,2 the
joint and survivorship bank account can exist only under a contract theory.3
The agreement, which exists between the depositor and the bank, provides
that the latter will pay the account to the survivor of the depositors or a third
party. The third party may be called the beneficiary of the contract be-
tween the depositor and the bank. Since the third party beneficiary of
a contract can disclaim, it follows that a similar right exists in the survivor of
a joint and survivorship account because her rights are also based upon a
contract.
The court supported its position by citing other permissible renunciations
in the property area as well as in the contract field. The donee of a gift of
personalty has the right to refuse it, and the disclaimer effects a return of
the gift to the donor.4 Likewise, the grantee of realty can disclaim and
thereby defeat the grant,5 and the beneficiary of a trust can refuse to accept
1 Rohrbacker v. Citizens Bldg. Ass'n, 138 Ohio St. 273, 34 N.E.2d 751 (1941);
Trimble v. Strother, 25 Ohio St. 378 (1874).
2 Wilson & Marsh v. Fleming, 13 Ohio 68 (1844); Sargent v. Steinberger, 2 Ohio
305 (1827); Martin, "The Incident of Survivorship in Ohio," 3 Ohio St. L.J. 48 (1936).
But see Cleaver v. Long, 69 Ohio L. Abs. 488, 126 N.E.2d 479 (C.P. 1955).
3 Berberick v. Courtade, 137 Ohio St. 297, 28 N.E.2d 636 (1940); Sage v. Flueck,
132 Ohio St. 377, 7 N.E.2d 802 (1937); Cleveland Trust Co. v. Scobie, 114 Ohio St. 241,
151 N.E. 373 (1926); In re Estate of Copeland, 74 Ohio App. 164, 58 N.E.2d 64 (1943);
Arthur v. Wittmeyer, 39 Ohio L. Abs. 505, 53 N.E.2d 915 (Ct. App. 1943); In re
Schroeder, 75 Ohio L. Abs. 555, 144 N.E.2d 512 (P. Ct. 1957); Ohio Rev. Code § 1105.09
(1954); Atkinson, Wills ff 40 (2d Ed. 1953); 4 Corbin, Contracts § 783 (1951); 1 Page,
Wills § 6.18 (4th Ed. 1960).
4 Streeper v. Myers, 132 Ohio St. 322, 7 N.E.2d 554 (1937); McCoy v. Gosser, 8
Ohio App. 145 (1917).
5 Lessee of Mitchell v. Ryan, 3 Ohio St. 377 (1855); Adams v. Adams, 107 Ohio
App. 1, 150 N.E.2d 81 (1958); McDevitt v. Morrow, 57 Ohio L. Abs. 281, 94 N.E.2d 2
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the proceeds designated for him.6 Under Ohio statutory and case law, a de-
visee or legatee of a will may refuse a devise or legacy in his favor.7 Ohio
Revised Code section 2113.60 provides that in the absence of a residuary
clause, the property disclaimed by the devisee or legatee shall pass in ac-
cordance with the statute of descent and distribution. While disclaimer is
permitted as a general rule, a renunciation of property passing by operation
of law cannot be made under the common law, but a recent Ohio statute
permits such disclaimer.8
Since the surviving spouse disclaimed her interest in the joint and
survivorship property, the problem of the property's devolution arose. The
joint and survivorship accounts and stock certificates were nonprobate assets
and therefore were not to be considered as part of the decedent's estate.9
The rights to this property were fixed by a contract, which created an in-
terest in the survivor when made. This interest is conditioned on her out-
living the depositor and if such condition is met, her right to the property
vests at his death. Hence, the assets in question would pass directly to the
survivor if a disclaimer had not been made. After giving effect to the dis-
claimer, the court decided that the properties were probate assets ab initio
and would pass as though the decedent had made no survivorship contract.
The property passed under the statute of descent and distribution because no
residuary clause appeared in the will. 10 In effect, a direct transfer of part of
the joint and survivorship property was made from the decedent to his
children.1
(Ct. App. 1950); In re Estate of Ketterer, 78 Ohio L. Abs. 204, 152 N.E.2d 178 (P. Ct.
1956).
6 Erman v. Erman, 101 Ohio App. 245, 136 N.E.2d 385 (1956).
7 Whigam v. Bannon, 21 Ohio App. 496, 153 N.E. 252 (1926); Ohio Rev. Code
§ 2113.60 (1954).
8 A recent Ohio statute allows any competent adult to renounce his interest in an
intestate succession by filing a written statement of renunciation with the probate court
within sixty days after notice of the hearing on inventory of the intestate's property has
been given. "Any property renounced pursuant to this section shall be distributed as
provided by law as if such competent adult had predeceased such decedent." Ohio Rev.
Code § 2105.061 (1961). See also Hardenbergh v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d 63 (8th Cir.
1952); Wallace v. MtcMicken, 13 Ohio Dec. Reprint 345 (Super. Ct. Cincinnati 1859);
Annot., 170 A.L.R. 435, 436 (1947): "According to the common law, title to the property
of one who dies intestate passes by force of the rules of law and no voluntary act on
the part of the decedent former owner or of the subsequent owner who takes by intestate
succession is of any legal significance. In conformity with this legal theory, it has been
held ... that the person who takes by intestate succession has no power to prevent the
passage of title to himself by renunciation."
9 Berberick v. Courtade, supra note 3; Oleff v. Hodapp, 129 Ohio St. 432, 195 N.E.
$38 (1935); Tax Comm'n of Ohio v. Hutchison, 120 Ohio St. 361, 166 N.E. 352 (1929);
Cleveland Trust Co. v. Scobie, supra note 3; Lambert v. Lambert, 95 Ohio App. 187,
118 N.E.2d 545 (1953); In re Estate of Copeland, supra note 3; In re Estate of Shangle,
32 Ohio L. Rep. 185 (Ct. App. 1930); In re Schroeder, supra note 3; Boehm, "Death and
Taxes I," 22 Ohio St. L.J. 327 (1961).
Vo Whigam v. Bannon, supra note 7; Ohio Rev. Code §§ 2105.06, 2113.60 (1954).
11 Ohio Rev. Code § 2105.06: "(b) If there is a spouse and one child or its lineal
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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
The allowance of disclaimer by the court can be readily accepted, but
one might inquire into the reason behind the survivor's desire to disclaim the
property. The answer lies in the tax advantages to be gained. The wife's
motive appears to be to effect a transfer of property to her children while
avoiding both Federal Estate and Gift Tax consequences and reducing her
taxable estate at death. If she had not disclaimed, her husband's estate would
include the joint and survivorship properties for Federal Estate Tax purposes
and would be liable for the amount of tax levied on this property.'2 Mrs.
Krakoff would be liable for the Ohio Inheritance Tax on the property, based
upon one-half the total value of this property.' 3 Also, at Mrs. Krakoff's death,
her estate would include these properties for Federal Estate Tax purposes
and her heirs would be liable for the Ohio Inheritance Tax based upon the
full value of the property. 14 The joint and survivorship property, in effect,
would have to pass through two estates.
The avoidance of tax liabilities brought about by the use of disclaimer
are substantial in this situation. Since the wife has renounced, the properties
in part will pass from the decedent's estate directly to his children. The
resulting tax consequences include only a Federal Estate Tax charge on the
decedent's estate'5 and the Ohio Inheritance Tax levied upon the full value
of the property, which is taxable to the children.'" By her refusal to accept
the properties, the spouse has thus avoided payment of a Federal Estate Tax
on most of the property at her death and has lessened the burden of the
Ohio Inheritance Tax at present.' 7 She has thus cut the amount of tax liability
approximately in half.
If the survivor had accepted the property and attempted to make an
inter vivos gift of the property to her children, the Federal Gift Tax might
well be applicable.'5 However, it does not appear that the transfer accom-
plished in the case could be treated as a gift from the survivor to her children
for Federal Gift Tax purposes. The Gift Tax assumes that the property is
the donor's to give, but this is not the case here. There was no actual ac-
ceptance by the survivor; she had only an option to accept which she de-
clined to exercise. Since she never acquired an interest in the property, she
could not have the power to make a gift.' 9
descendants surviving, one half to the spouse and one half to such child or its lineal de-
scendants, per stirpes; (c) If there is a spouse and more than one child or their lineal
descendants surviving, one third to the spouse and the remainder to the children equally,
or to the lineal descendants of any deceased child, per stirpes."
12 See Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 2001, 2002, 2011, 2051, 2052.
13 Tax Comm'n of Ohio v. Hutchison, supra note 9; Tax Comm'n v. Reeves, 11
Ohio L. Abs. 154 (Ct. App. 1931); In re Estate of Sawyer, 36 Ohio Op. 234, 75 N.E.2d
695 (P. Ct. 1947); In re Estate of Kirkham, 21 Ohio Op. 342, 6 Ohio Supp. 293 (P. Ct.
1941); Ohio Rev. Code § 5731.02(e) (1954).
14 Ohio Rev. Code § 5731.02(a) (1954).
1' See Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 2001, 2002, 2011, 2051, 2052.
16 Ohio Rev. Code § 5731.02(a) (1954).
17 Ohio Rev. Code § 5731.02(e) (1954).
18 See Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 2501, 2502, 2521, 2522.
19 Gallagher v. Smith, 223 F.2d 218 (3d Cir. 1955); Brown v. Routzahn, 63 F.2d 914
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The legal aspects of this disclaimer are interesting but certainly not
startling. Similar devices have been used in many situations where benefits
would otherwise pass either under property or contract theories. It follows
that a renunciation in this case is proper since it applies essentially to a right
created by contract. The real value of the case is its illustration of a possible
use of disclaimer for tax avoidance purposes. The desire of the spouse was
obviously to effect the transfer of these assets to her children. By disclaiming,
she accomplished this purpose and reduced the tax consequences in the proc-
ess.
(6th Cir. 1933); Tax Comm'n v. Glass, 119 Ohio St. 389, 164 N.E. 425 (1925); People v.
Flanagin, 331 Il. 203, 162 N.E. 848 (1928); Kay, "Renunciations, Disclaimers and Re-
leases," 35 Taxes 767 (1957); Rice, Family Tax Planning 878 (1960); Note, "Disclaimers
in Federal Taxation," 63 Harv. L. Rev. 1047 (1950); Ohio Rev. Code § 2105.061 (1961).
